Right or wrong, it&#8217;s democracy. Legitimacy, justification and the independent criterion by C. Destri
169      Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XIX, 2017, 2, pp. 169-190 
  
RIGHT OR WRONG, IT’S 
DEMOCRACY. 
LEGITIMACY, JUSTIFICATION 
AND THE INDEPENDENT 
CRITERION 
 
Chiara Destri 
Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali e Politiche 
Università di Milano  
chiara.destri@unimi.it  
 
 “To find a form of association that may defend and protect with the whole force 
of the community the person and property of every associate, and by means of 
which each, joining together with all, may nevertheless obey only himself, and 
remain as free as before.” Such is the fundamental problem of which the social 
contract provides the solution. (Rousseau 1763, 163)  
 
ABSTRACT  
Contemporary normative theories of democracy generally aim to show that 
democratic outcomes are legitimate and hence they ought to be obeyed. As it is 
known, the battlefield is split between two major approaches: instrumentalism and 
proceduralism. Yet, many philosophers of both approaches seem to overlook one 
distinction that ought to be crucial in their reasoning - or so I argue in this paper. 
First, I highlight this distinction between the justification of outcomes on one hand, 
and their legitimacy on the other. If the justification of outcomes is unachievable 
given circumstances of pluralism and disagreement, their legitimacy derives from 
the procedures that bring them about. Hence both accounts present a justification 
of democratic procedures by reference to a criterion that is independent from the 
procedures themselves.  Second, I propose to distinguish between instrumentalism 
and proceduralism on the basis of the connection that these approaches draw 
between the justifying criterion and democratic procedures. While for 
instrumentalism this is contingent and indirect, for proceduralism it is direct and 
necessary. Finally, I take into account two well-known taxonomies in epistemic 
democracy, which are provided by David Estlund and Fabienne Peter, and I argue 
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that both blur the distinction between the justification of outcomes and their 
legitimacy and are thus unsatisfactory and misleading.    
KEYWORDS 
Democracy, instrumentalism, proceduralism, legitimacy, David Estlund, Fabienne 
Pete 
 
INTRODUCTION 
We live under democratic regimes. We don’t live too badly and we  
think this depends (in part) on the fact that we live under democratic 
regimes. Hence, we may find those regimes good in this respect. That is, 
we can reasonably think that we have good, even conclusive, reasons to 
take democracy as justified and thus to want to establish democratic 
institutions. But does this mean that we also ought to obey democratic 
outcomes? Are we to take these outcomes as legitimate even though we 
may sometimes find them plainly wrong? In my paper I want to tackle 
these two related issues that concern democracy1, its justification and 
legitimacy, and inquire about their relation.  
I have two aims in this paper. First of all, I intend to clarify a small 
confusion that happens to blur the debate: the one between particular 
outcomes and democratic procedures. This may seem a minor point, 
but it is relevant if we aim to account for the so-called circumstances of 
politics (Waldron 1999) and if we want to accommodate disagreement 
over what are the best decisions to take. In order to understand why the 
fact that we disagree over some specific outcomes does not immediately 
give us reasons to disobey, we need to bear in mind that justification and 
legitimacy of a single decision are different questions. If that is the case, 
the legitimacy of democratic outcomes depends on the kind of 
procedure that issued them2.  
 
1 In this paper, I take democracy canonically to stand for majority rule of decision-
making and fundamental rights protection and to be constituted by deliberative and 
voting processes. Thus, my analysis concerns both aggregative and deliberative models 
of democracy. 
2 As Peter (2016) argues, there are at least three grounds for legitimacy: consent, 
beneficial effects and democratic procedure. While the former identifies legitimate 
authority with individuals’ consenting to it (and thus conveys no normative force); the 
second revolves around authority’s beneficial consequences and requires people to obey 
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Once we turn to the justification of democratic procedures, we are at 
a crossroads. There are two well-known broad approaches to the 
justification of democracy: instrumentalism and proceduralism. My 
second aim in this paper is to propose a new ground to draw a line 
between these two and to reframe such opposition as instrumentalism 
versus intrinsicalism. Insofar as both accounts distinguish between 
outcome legitimacy and outcome justification, they ought to provide a 
justification of democracy that can secure the legitimacy of its outcomes, 
especially when they are unjustifiable. Following David Estlund’s 
criticism of fair proceduralism (2008), I argue that both do so with 
respect to a value or a set of value that works as procedure-independent 
criterion. While instrumentalism conceives the relationship between 
such criterion and democratic process as contingent, albeit sufficient, to 
produce on average substantively good outcomes; intrinsicalism takes 
democracy to be a necessary condition for the realization of the 
independent criterion that justifies democracy, according to each 
different account. 
Therefore, I intend to argue that: (a) a proper justification requires to 
conceive an independent criterion that acts as justifier of democracy; (b) 
the connection between such criterion and democracy itself may be 
either necessary or contingent. Then, I aim to show how this distinction 
clarifies some confusion in the current debate on epistemic democracy. 
Whereas certain accounts are clearly instrumentalist (Goodin and List 
2001, Goodin 2003, Landemore 2013), others qualify themselves as 
proceduralist (Estlund 2008, Peter 2008). If my argument is so far sound, 
then both the focus on the justification of procedures and the distinction 
between instrumentalism and intrinsicalism may help shed light to these 
last two approaches. On one hand, both Estlund and Peter propose 
taxonomies of current democratic accounts that end up concealing the 
distinction between instrumentalism and intrinsicalism. On the other, in 
Estlund’s case, such confusion induces him to misunderstand his own 
standing in the debate, or so I try to argue.  
The paper is organized as follows. The first section regards the 
distinction between justification and legitimacy of outcomes. I criticize 
approaches to democracy that merge these two dimensions and I take 
Waldron’s circumstances of politics to be a good reason to draw a line  
authority insofar as it brings positive outcomes. My whole paper will stand within the 
third category and I won’t discuss the other two.  
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between the two. I also argue that outcome legitimacy ought to depend 
entirely on the procedure that issues it.  
Section two introduces a reformulation of the possible justifications of 
democracy and proposes to use an independent criterion whose 
connection to democracy serves as a qualifier of the justificatory 
approach. Finally, in section three I show that, based on the previous 
arguments, both Peter’s and Estlund’s taxonomies are unsatisfactory, 
and argue for focusing on the distinction between outcome legitimacy 
and outcome justification. 
I 
Both justification and legitimacy are multifaceted concepts that can 
regard different domains of normative political theory. First, we can say 
that a decision is justified or legitimate, and we mean different things by 
using one adjective or the other. But second, we can also question the 
justification or legitimacy of the political authority that issues such 
decisions or, we can wonder whether the exercise of coercive power in 
the society we live in is justified or legitimate 3 . Finally, we can ask 
whether a certain specific procedure for taking the decision is legitimate 
or justified.  All these attributions are slightly but importantly different 
and make the distinction between these two concepts more confused for 
anyone who addresses it4.  
The first thing to notice is that justification and legitimacy convey 
different meanings. In a very general sense, when we claim that a certain 
decision is justified we mean that there are conclusive reasons in its 
 
3 As both Peter (2013) and Perry (2013) notice, there are at least two approaches to 
the problem of political legitimacy: the first is authority-based (Raz 1986, Christiano 
2004, 2008, Perry 2013), while the second is coercion-based (Ripstein 2004, Rawls 2005, 
Estlund 2008). A proper inquire over the meaning and functioning of the concept of 
legitimacy is beyond the aims of this paper, as I will only tackle the issue of justification 
of democracy and hold that this is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of its 
outcomes.  
4 The last forty years of debate over the issue of public justification have also possibly 
made things more confused, as it has collapsed the two concepts. Following Rawls 
(2005), the use of coercive power has been defined as legitimate to the extent that it was 
able to appear justified to all reasonable people. For a criticism of Rawlsian approach 
see Simmons 1999. For a proceduralist interpretation of the requirement of public 
reason that makes it a pure proceduralist justification of democracy see Peter 2008, 95-
100. 
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favor5. Conversely, the notion of legitimacy refers to a specific right to 
rule that any political authority has over those subjected to it6. When 
these two concepts are applied to political decisions and laws, they have 
two different implications. On one hand, a justified political decision is a 
decision for which there are conclusive reasons or that I can accept. On 
the other, a legitimate political decision is a decision that ought to be 
obeyed. Since Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s forerunner account of 
democratic legitimacy, theories of democracy have confronted 
themselves with this problem and have tried to answer it by offering a 
decision-making procedure that yields collective decisions that are 
binding on all and that nonetheless respect individuals’ freedom and 
will (Rousseau 1763, 163). There are two possible takes on this issue and 
both have been explored by democratic theorists. I will only mention the 
first and I will focus on the second. 
The first attempt can be exemplified by Jürgen Habermas’s and 
Joshua Cohen’s accounts of deliberative democracy (Habermas 1996, 
Cohen 1997a, 1997b). According to their models, majority rule and 
equal right to participation do not constitute the only central features of 
democracy, but are rather completed by the idea of deliberation7. Here I 
cannot provide a proper account of the functions that deliberation is 
meant to fulfill, contrary to traditional aggregative approaches to 
democracy (Arrow 1963). It will suffice to say that since the “public 
discourse mediates between reason and will” (Habermas 1996, 475-476), 
 
5 For the purposes of this article I need not to take stance on what counts as a 
normative reason (see Raz 2011) or on a specifically externalist or internalist account of 
justification (see Gaus 1996). So I will only refer to justification in the very general sense 
of ‘conclusive considerations in favor of’.  
6 Concerning political legitimacy, not only there are different approaches to it, as 
mentioned in note 4, but the very concept of normative legitimacy has been taken to 
identify different kinds of ‘right to rule’. On one reading, legitimacy consists in a 
justification-right to use coercion, without any political obligation on the part of those 
subject to political power (Ladenson 1980, Buchanan 2002, Estlund 2008, Kolodny 
2014a, 2014b). On the other reading, instead, legitimacy is a claim-right to command, 
which entails a duty to obey (Simmons 1979, 1999, Christiano 2004, 2008, 2013, 
Lefkowitz 2005). In what follows I will refer to legitimacy as imposing a duty to obey, 
but my analysis remains neutral with respect to this distinction and maintains its 
validity also with the first interpretation of legitimacy.  
7 Deliberative democratic theories, although declining, are one of the fundamental 
paradigms of democracy of the last thirty years. I will not provide an account of it or of 
its supporters’ different, as here I focus on its epistemic version. For a general 
introduction see Bohman and Rehg 1997, Besson and Martí 2006.  
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it allows deliberative democracy to enjoy both legitimacy and 
justification. Indeed, the deliberative-democratic process, as long as it is 
conducted according to certain ideal procedural criteria, represents both 
a necessary and a sufficient condition to produce a rationally justified 
collective decision. According to Habermas, because the aim of 
deliberation as described by the ideal speech situation is to reach 
consensus, this decision will be justified to everyone’s lights. According 
to Cohen, who heavily draws on Rawls’s ideas of public justification and 
original position (Rawls 1971, 15-19), a properly constrained deliberative 
process will yield outcomes that all will find acceptable. In both cases, 
deliberative democratic procedures that respect their ideal counterpart 
will ensure both justification and legitimacy; that is, they will generate 
outcomes justified rationally and hence binding. As a consequence, 
these accounts put together the two concepts of justification and 
legitimacy by claiming that all and only justified decisions are decisions 
which we ought to obey8.  
There are two problems with such a position. Firstly, it depends on 
the role of consensus or public acceptability. Either deliberation ensures 
that all outcomes are justified to all or majority rule will intervene to cut 
discussion and finalize a decision irrespective of unanimity. But because 
in such a case the collective decision won’t be justified to all, those who 
disagree will wonder why they should accept it and will hence question 
its legitimacy. But secondly, and more importantly, it blurs the 
distinction between actual procedures and ideal ones. If Habermas’ and 
Cohen’s point is that all actual democratic outcomes are legitimate 
because they are justified to all, this is simply not true. We happen to 
disagree a lot, and there are many democratic decisions that we find 
wrong. On the other hand, if they mean that actual democratic decisions 
are justified because they could have been the result of an ideal 
democratic procedure, then it is their conformity to the ideal procedure 
that makes them both justified and legitimate. But if that is the case, the 
ideal procedure ends up being a substantive criterion of evaluation, 
albeit procedurally constructed, that applies directly to outcomes and is 
 
8 The project of public justification as well, in its substantive interpretation, can be 
taken exemplify such a position. See, among many, Rawls 2005, Quong 2011, Gaus 
1996, 2011, D’Agostino 1996. However, it is important to notice that: (a) the consensus 
model refers only to reasonable acceptability and hence does not require unanimous 
consensus; (b) the public justification approach is not susceptible to the criticism I lay 
out further in the text against Habermas’s and Cohen’s accounts. 
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indifferent to their democratic pedigree9. For instance, an omniscient 
dictator who were able to reconstruct the ideal deliberative procedure in 
his head would be much more effective in producing justified, hence 
legitimate, results. But this means that we lose sight of the link between 
the outcomes of ideal democratic procedures and the outcomes of actual 
democratic ones. As a result, the fact that collective decisions have been 
made by actual democratic procedures is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient reason to take them as legitimate, unless their content also 
conforms to the one that would have been issued by ideal procedures. In 
the end, we have either over-legitimation or under-legitimation (see 
Ottonelli 2012), because actual decisions are both unjustified and 
illegitimate or legitimate and justified. 
The second solution pursues a different strategy, as it draws a clear-
cut line between the justification of outcomes and their legitimacy. 
According to these stances, the fact of pluralism and disagreement make 
it impossible for each and every decision to get universal approval. As 
Jeremy Waldron reproaches to John Rawls, we do not only happen to 
have divergent comprehensive doctrines, but we also disagree over the 
very public conception of justice that reasonable citizens ought to share, 
according to Rawls10. Therefore, we cannot cling to it in order to justify 
collective decisions, as they inevitably won’t appear so to all those 
citizens who in good faith disagree over what justice requires (Waldron 
1999, 149-154). By modifying Rawls’s circumstances of justice (Rawls 
1971, 109-112), Waldron sets up what he calls the ‘circumstances of 
politics’, which specify the conditions that make politics both possible 
and necessary (Waldron 1999, 101-106). These are the fact of 
disagreement and the need of cooperation. As he says, disagreement 
matters because we need to take collectively binding decisions, as 
otherwise, if we did not need to cooperate, we would not care about 
disagreeing. On the other hand, if we all agreed on what to do on each 
and every instance, we would not experience the necessity for 
 
9 For this reason Peter includes Habermas’ deliberative democratic model among 
perfectly proceduralist, rather than purely proceduralist accounts (Peter 2008, 71). For 
the distinction between pure, perfect and imperfect proceduralism see Rawls 1971, 85. 
10 Rawls posits a fundamental distinction between the political conception of justice, 
on which reasonable citizens in a Well-Ordered Society agree, and comprehensive 
doctrines characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism under contemporary liberal-
democratic regimes, as he states in Political Liberalism. See Rawls 2005.  
176       CHIARA DESTRI  
 
collectively binding decisions because we would act according to our 
own judgment11.   
In a way, it seems plausible to wonder whether we could still talk of 
legitimacy without disagreement over what to do. If we were to agree 
with every single collective decision, either because we take it to be 
intrinsically just or correct, or because we find it instrumentally useful to 
realize our aims and ends, we would never face circumstances where we 
ought to obey to decision we strongly disagree with12. A little thought-
experiment may be of help here. If we lived in a very bizarre social 
world where we all agreed on every single issue and we knew that we so 
agreed, it seems reasonable to think that we would be able to harmonize 
spontaneously and act according to our common knowledge. We would 
live in the realization of Thomas Hobbes’s wild dream of ants and bees, 
whose communities are immune to disagreement and which are able to 
coordinate following a natural hierarchy (Hobbes 1651, 113)13. To be sure, 
we would still have to take collective decisions in order to coordinate 
and hence would need a decision-making procedure of some kind. But, 
by hypothesis, almost any decision-making procedure would do, since 
we would know that we would agree on each and every decision. We 
could take decisions democratically or autocratically; we could vote or 
we could select by lot one of us taking decisions always or only for a 
certain amount of time. Certainly not any decision-making procedure 
would treat all of us in the same way, as for instance the autocrat would 
get to decide everything on her own. However, it seems difficult to think 
that this would be a problem, because the final decision would be one 
on which we all agreed and none of us would feel to have it imposed 
upon him and he would know that. The demand for legitimacy arises 
when a decision, which we deemed unjustified, is imposed on us.  If we  
11 One possible objection to this kind of argument regards akrasia, that is, the fact 
that people violate their own judgment of what is the best thing to do (on which by 
hypothesis they agree with all others). As I said earlier in the article, in this case we 
would still need political authority, but with the considerably weakened function to 
handle akrasia. Another objection concerns coordination problems, like on what side of 
the road to drive. Here, there is no better decision, as both sides are fine as long as we 
coordinate on one of them. Here a decision-making procedure would still be necessary, 
but since we would be indifferent with respect to the specific decision taken, it seems 
hard to believe that a proper issue of legitimacy would arise.  
12 In a relevant way, we could not be said to obey to anything, since we would respect 
the law willingly and spontaneously, even though this depends on what we take 
obedience to consist of, and it is true only if we take it to require some sort of 
disagreement with the reasons behind the law. 
13 A similar thought is expressed by David Estlund. See Estlund 2008, 71. 
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were to agree (and know that all of us agree) on all collective decisions, 
the only problem of political authority would be to ensure compliance 
with these decisions by akratic citizens. And since the main function of 
political authority would be to handle akrasia, we would perhaps be able 
to forsake democracy14.  
In another closer, but still quite bizarre world, we could agree on 
every decision as well, without knowing that we do so agree. In such a 
world, we would have  greater need for a decision-making procedure, 
because we would not be sure that we really agree on what to do. 
Decision-making procedures would deploy only an epistemic and 
detective function, as they would just make clear to all what the agreed-
upon decisions were. However, in such a world we would not share these 
decisions as common knowledge, hence the need for a detective 
procedure, and we would not be sure of our agreement. In fact, from this 
world inhabitants’ point of view, there would be no way to distinguish 
between a world where such unanimous consent is near at hand and one 
where it is not. Therefore, decision-making procedures would have to be 
justified irrespective of whether unanimity is available or not, because 
people who followed them would be uncertain about their capacity to 
reach generally justifiable decisions. Under these conditions, the issue of 
legitimacy would arise and take form and substance, since there would 
be the actual possibility that we ought to obey to decisions we disagreed 
about.  
Waldron’s intuition seems to be that fairness and justice are on 
different levels. While the latter concerns our different worldviews, life 
plans, moral and religious conceptions, which happen to differ, pace 
Rawls, the former defines what are the fair conditions to handle 
disagreement over justice (Waldron 1999, 195-198). In particular, under 
conditions of pluralism and disagreement, fairness requires that 
decisions everyone ought to abide by be produced in a way that respects 
the fact that people may disagree over those decisions. Therefore, the 
legitimacy of laws and policies does not depend on their substantive 
value, but by the fact that they have been generated according to a fair  
14 Given the problem of akrasia and in general the possibility of people acting to 
pursue their self-interest rather than the justified decision (on which they would still 
agree, though), there would still be the need of a political authority that exercised 
coercive power. What I contend is that such authority would not need to be democratic 
and, if it were, the reasons for this would be very different from our actual justifications 
of democracy, given disagreement.  
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procedure, which respects each citizen’s own judgment on the issue at 
hand. But since only democracy attributes an equal right to a say to 
every citizen, democracy is the only fair, hence legitimate procedure.  
This switch from the justification of particular decisions to a focus on 
decision-making procedures that yield them is behind most current 
theories of democratic legitimacy (Waldron 1999, Estlund 2008, 
Christiano 2008, 2013, Peter 2008, 2016). These theories offer a 
procedural account of the legitimacy of collective decisions by claiming 
that said legitimacy depends on the way these decisions have been 
made. Since they are made democratically, this provides them with a 
particular right to rule, irrespective of their substantive justification. 
Since the specific content of particular decisions does not play a role in 
their being legitimate, the problem of justification of each decision is 
foregone and replaced with the problem of its legitimacy. For this 
reason, proceduralist accounts of democratic legitimacy can better 
answer  the problem of disagreement. In fact, they do not ask citizens to 
take all collectively binding decisions as justified, but only to recognize 
their legitimacy in virtue of the procedures that lent them.  
Nevertheless, while I think that this sort of argument convincingly 
shows why to draw a line between justification and legitimacy of 
collective decisions, it does not directly support democracy. That is, 
democracy as a decision-making procedure need not be justified given 
the fact of disagreement, as there could be perfectly convincing reasons 
that defend democracy even when we all agree15. The problem is that 
any political regime that claims to lend legitimate outcomes has to take 
disagreement into account. Despite current justifications of democracy 
(e.g. Waldron 1999, Christiano 2008), the former example illustrates how 
disagreement is morally significant only to the extent that we have to 
abide by decisions that we might find wrong. Therefore, it is not the 
distinctive working of democracy that depends on the fact of 
disagreement; rather, it is the question of legitimacy, which arises only 
conditionally on it. Democracy is but one, albeit purportedly the best, 
way to account for the procedural legitimacy of collective decisions. 
However, contrary to what Waldron seems to hold, this does not settle 
all disputes. In fact, two objections can be moved towards his account. 
 
15 For instance, if we think that a procedure ought to treat people as equals, this can 
be true and worthwhile irrespective of the fact that those equals agree on the final 
decision to make. However, in this case we could assess the justice of the said procedure 
and we would not deal with its legitimacy, as people would still end up complying with 
outcomes because they agree with them and not despite they think they are wrong.  
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First, if it is undoubtedly true that matters of justice are controversial, as 
Waldron reproaches to Rawls, it is indeed also true that matters of 
procedure and of procedural fairness are controversial as well (e.g. 
Christiano 2000, Enoch 2007). Perhaps we can safely say that democracy 
is at least morally permissible, if not plainly the fairest possible decision-
making procedure. But, even if we can hope to reach such unanimous 
consensus, which is unlikely if we confront ourselves with all human 
societies in all times, still there would be room to argue over which kind 
of democracy would be the best or most suited to us. The simple fact 
that democracy is fair would not help us to adjudicate between a more 
populist, more ‘epistocratic’, more liberal or more majoritarian 
democracy, if all these versions of democracy crucially hinge on the 
conception of fairness we embrace. Given that disagreement touches 
also on what is the best and fairest decision-making procedure, even 
within a more or less democratic framework, we need a clear 
justification of democracy that ought to provide us with reasons to infer 
from the specific value of democracy the legitimacy of its outcomes. 
Moreover, it is not as clear as Waldron thinks that fairness and justice 
are at two different levels, where the former is prior and trumping with 
respect to the latter. Since what is really fair is also controversial, why 
should we do without justice for the sake of fairness? 
Second, Waldron’s account falls prey of the same weakness that 
affects all other fairness-based justifications of democracy and that has 
been phrased by David Estlund. Not only is there not one unique fair 
way to take decisions, but also procedural fairness does not seem to 
suffice to provide a convincing justification of democracy. If we take 
fairness in its most basic interpretation as ‘full anonymity’, we can see 
how the fact that a procedure is blind to personal features is not enough 
to take it as justified. Or at least, when we try to justify democracy, 
procedural fairness is not all that matters, for otherwise we would be 
contented with a decision-making procedure by lottery or by the renown 
coin flip (Estlund 2008, 72-84). Therefore, in order to make sense of 
both deliberation and voting, we ought to make reference to substantive 
values, as procedural fairness won’t get us far enough 16 . Epistemic  
16 I make explicit reference to deliberation and voting because these are the main 
features of current justifications of democracy, especially in its epistemic version. 
However, Estlund’s argument also works with aggregative conception of democracy, 
insofar as they take decision-making procedures to be sensitive to people’s beliefs and 
preferences. Insofar as these procedures ought to be responsive to individuals’ 
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accounts of democracy have recently flourished with this precise aim to 
complete or replace fairness-based justification of democratic legitimacy 
by appealing to its epistemic quality (Cohen 1986, Goodin and List 2001, 
Estlund 2008, Peter 2008, Landemore 2013). Among them, Estlund’s 
epistemic proceduralism is one of the most influential and the one that 
explicitly states the distinction between the outcome justification and 
outcome legitimacy. But why should we take the fact that collective 
decisions have been made democratically to be a sufficient reason to 
obey them even if they are wrong? 
II 
Once the distinction between outcome justification and outcome 
legitimacy is fixed, the focus switches to democratic procedures, and a 
proper theory of democracy ought to offer a workable and convincing 
justification of these procedures. To claim that democracy is fair, in the 
sense of being fully anonymous, would not do, because this would not 
grasp the distinctiveness of democracy with respect to lot or coin flip 
and because mere fairness does not appear as a good reason to obliterate 
outcome justification, especially when we are dealing with very wrong 
decisions17. There is something more to democracy, and the problem of 
its justification consists in giving good reasons to abide by democratic 
decisions, despite some of them might turn out to be wrong18. 
Let us take a step back, though. Once the focus is perspicuously set on 
the justification of procedures, to talk of proceduralism and procedural 
values can become quite confusing. As it is well known, normative 
theories that justify democracy are usually divided in two broad 
categories: instrumentalism and proceduralism. However, since both of 
them deal with procedures, as it is manifest so far, both accounts cannot 
but be ‘procedural’ in a way, as these are the objects they set up to  
preference rankings, aggregative accounts make reference to procedure-independent 
standards for outcomes as well. See Estlund 2008, 72-76. 
17 Although I won’t deal with such an issue, it is important to observe how this 
distinction between outcome legitimacy and outcome justification leaves open the 
problem of how to react when outcomes are too unjust. Different accounts of the 
justifying value of democratic procedures will propose different, albeit similar, accounts 
of the limits of democratic legitimacy and ought to be completed by theories that 
explain when and to what extent democratic decisions are not legitimate anymore and 
civil disobedience is justified.  
18  John A. Simmons would argue that any justification of democracy would not 
suffice to lend legitimacy to its outcomes, because said legitimacy can only rest on 
consent. He might have a point in holding that to say that that a political regime is just 
does not necessarily entail that it has a right to rule. However, this in turn does not 
mean that consent is the only ground of legitimacy either. See Simmons 1979, 1999. 
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justify. This must have been the thought behind Estlund’s proposed 
taxonomy of different accounts of democracy, which basically consists in 
an opposition between ‘impartial proceduralism’, on the one hand, and 
‘epistemic theories’, on the other (Estlund 2008, 102). But let us proceed 
with order.  How can proceduralism be a meaningful account of 
justification for a procedure? Hoping to shed some light, I will now 
reframe the traditional distinction in a distinction between 
instrumentalism and ‘intrinsicalism’. 
If Estlund’s criticism of procedural fairness is sound, any acceptable 
justification of democracy ought to present a procedure-independent 
value or a set of values according to which democracy itself is justifiable 
as a morally permissible or best decision-making procedure in the 
market. Call this the procedure-independent criterion of justification. 
Instrumentalists do so by taking democracy to be a means to something 
else, which is the ‘real value’ they are after. It can be equality, as it is with 
Richard Arneson (2003), or it can be some moral virtue, which the 
democratic process allows citizens to realize through participation, with 
John Stuart Mill (1861). Be it its direct outcome or its by-product, still 
democratic procedure is taken to be the best way to achieve such result. 
However, democracy does so only in a contingent way: it is not the only 
possible way to achieve such result, although it can be the most effective 
one under nowadays contingent conditions. It is not that such 
justification is piecemeal, as Thomas Christiano claims19, because we can 
consistently take it to be valid for all subjects and for all outcomes. In 
fact, any instrumentalist account, so long as it proposes a justification of 
democratic procedures, will confer legitimacy to all democratic 
outcomes. The point is that outcome legitimacy depends on the 
justification of democratic procedure according to an independent 
criterion that applies contingently and indirectly to the said procedure.  
Let us take the famous Condorcet Jury Theorem as an example 
(Condorcet 1785)20. It says that if three conditions obtain, then the more 
people there will be for a certain option, the likelier it will be that the  
19 Thomas Christiano proposes to draw a distinction between piecemeal and holistic 
justifications and states that instrumentalist justification will depend on the subject and 
on the class of decisions taken, thus being piecemeal, while proceduralist accounts are 
holistic, because they ground democratic authority in the same way for all citizens 
(Christiano 2006). 
20 For arguments in favor of and against the CJT as a good epistemic justification of 
democracy see: Grofman and Feld 1988, Estlund, et al. 1989, Goodin and List 2001, 
Goodin 2003, Estlund 2008. 
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option is right. The three conditions are: (1) that there is a binary choice, 
where one option is right and the other wrong; (2) that the average 
competence of voting population is better than random; (3) that people 
cast their vote independently from one another. If the second condition 
is not satisfied, then the mechanism reverses and the more people want 
option A, the likelier it will be that A is wrong. Although such a theorem 
is an instrumentalist justification of democracy, that draws its value 
from the substantive quality of its outcomes, it still qualifies democracy 
as necessarily getting the right results. What about the contingency? The 
point is that the Condorcet Jury Theorem takes democratic procedures 
to be justified only contingently, insofar as the underlying three 
conditions hold, and only as one possible way, among others, to get the 
right result. 
Therefore, according to instrumentalism, it is not because the 
procedure has some quality in itself that its outcomes ought to be 
obeyed. Rather, the procedure is justified because it tends to produce on 
average outcomes that respect the procedure-independent criterion of 
justification. Given the distinction between outcome legitimacy and 
outcome justification, it is easy to see how instrumentalists can easily 
account for wrong decisions. In fact, it is both perfectly plausible and 
possible that certain democratic outcomes will be wrong. However, they 
will still retain their legitimacy, if democracy can be shown to produce 
on average correct results.  
On the contrary, intrinsicalism conceives the relation between the 
independent criterion and democracy in a quite different way. In fact, 
the kind of values that justify democracy is achieved necessarily through 
that process. Hence, democratic procedures play a determinant role, as 
they represent a necessary condition for the realization of the justifying 
value, whose fulfillment cannot be obtained without democracy. It is still 
a procedure-independent criterion, because it is logically distinct from 
actual democratic procedures to which it refers. However, there are no 
other ways to realize the independent criterion without democracy being 
realized (e.g. Christiano 2008, Peter 2008). In a way, democracy may be 
said to embody such value and thus cannot be left aside if we want that 
value to become real. In this sense, intrinsicalist accounts are all those 
which take democratic procedures to be “constitutive of legitimacy” 
(Peter 2008, 64) in a way alien to instrumentalism. However, this does 
not depend on the fact that intrinsicalism avoids relying on a procedure-
independent criterion (Peter 2008, 64), but only on the kind of necessary 
and direct connection that intrinsicalism devises between said criterion 
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and democracy itself 21 . On both accounts, democratic outcomes are 
legitimate even if they might be wrong. On intrinsicalist account, 
however, these outcomes retain their legitimacy although they might be 
all wrong, because the reason for democracy itself to be justified is 
independent from the kind of decisions it makes on average.  
III 
I think that the distinction between intrinsicalism and 
instrumentalism can help shed light on  some confusions that happen to 
affect two main accounts of the so-called epistemic proceduralism and 
their related taxonomies: Fabienne Peter’s and David Estlund’s. I intend 
to argue, on the one hand, that while Estlund’s account rightly 
distinguishes between justification and legitimacy of democratic 
decisions, it ends up misconceiving the opposition of intrinsicalism and 
instrumentalism. As a consequence, he disguises himself as a pure 
proceduralist when he in fact holds a mixed account. On the other hand, 
I argue that Peter neglects the distinction between outcome legitimacy 
and outcome justification, with the result of putting properly 
proceduralist accounts of democracy under the same category, as 
Estlund’s 22 , and accounts like Pettit’s or Habermas’s, which make 
outcome legitimacy rest (also) on outcome justification, rather than only 
on procedures. 
According to Peter, while pure proceduralism draws on political 
equality 23 , rational proceduralism makes reference to both political 
equality and the quality of democratic outcomes (Peter 2008, 67). 
Following Christiano (2004), Peter qualifies this latter account as 
dualistic, because it takes two dimensions of evaluation into 
consideration when justifying democracy: the process itself and the 
quality of its outcomes. This might seem very similar to the way I drew  
21 As a consequence, any criticism against instrumentalism that pinpoints to its lack 
of respect for pluralism and disagreement because it fails to acknowledge such 
constitutive relation between democracy and legitimacy misfires. It is true that 
instrumentalism recognizes only an indirect and contingent connection between any 
justifying criterion and democracy, but once democracy is taken to be justified, then all 
its outcomes will be legitimate.  
22 I define Estlud’s account properly proceduralist because he takes legitimacy to rest 
on the justification of procedures. However, since said justification happens to be both 
intrinsicalist and instrumental, his account qualifies as mixed or dualistic and not has 
purely procedural or simply intrinsicalist. 
23 Peter refers to political fairness and political equality as synonyms. Since Estlund’s 
criticism of fairness, I take Peter to identify political fairness with a less procedural and 
more substantive account of political equality. See Peter 2008, 81-86.  
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the distinction between instrumentalism and intrinsicalism earlier on. 
However, Peter’s category of rational proceduralism, in its aggregative, 
deliberative and epistemic forms, fails to acknowledge a very relevant 
distinction. Peter puts accounts that are mixed forms of intrinsicalism 
and instrumentalism under the same category, as Estlund’s rational 
epistemic proceduralism, as she dubs it, and other accounts that are 
intrinsicalist with a specific requirement of rationality that applies to 
every and each outcomes (Pettit 2001) 24. While Estlund preserves the 
distinction between outcome legitimacy and outcome justification, by 
making reference only to the justification of procedures (that lends in 
turn outcome legitimacy), Pettit intrinsically justifies democracy, but 
adds to it the justification of every democratic outcome in order to 
achieve their legitimacy. However, if we ought to obey to democratic 
decisions only when they are also justified, we end up pursuing the same 
mistaken strategy that we ruled out at the beginning. 
A similar taxonomical problem affects Estlund’s epistemic 
proceduralism, because of an even more blurred account of the 
distinction between outcomes and procedures. This happens despite the 
fact that Estlund manifestly recognizes the distinction between 
legitimacy and justification concerning outcomes. As he says, the 
question with legitimacy is to provide “moral reasons to comply, not 
epistemic reasons to believe” (Estlund 2008, 106) and any convincing 
justification of democracy ought to account for such a distinction if it 
wants to avoid the problem of deference (Estlund 2008, 102-104). This 
problem concerns all those epistemic theories that identify justification 
with legitimacy.  
As we have seen, according to accounts supporting this identification, 
democratic decisions ought to be obeyed only insofar as they are 
justified. However, while Habermas’s and Cohen’s accounts refer to 
justification in the sense of consensus or public justifiability and refrain 
from truth or correctness, epistemic accounts take legitimacy to rely on 
correctness or truth. Thus, when deliberativists like Habermas and 
Cohen hold all and only justified decisions to be legitimate, they do not 
incur in the deference problem, because they do not claim that 
democracy tracks any truth of the matter and demands of us to change 
 
24 While Habermas’s and Cohen’s accounts of justification are substantive, Pettit’s is 
formal, as he takes justified outcomes to be ones that are consistent with the premises to 
which citizens have previously consented. To the extent that I employ justification in its 
very general meaning of conclusive reasons in favor, this distinction does not affect my 
argument.  
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our convictions according to its outcomes. However, if legitimacy of 
outcomes hinges on their being correct, there emerges the deference 
problem. When decisions are the product of actual democratic process 
and this is taken to produce only justified results, we not only ought to 
obey these decisions, but we also ought to take them as true. This means 
that we ought to acknowledge both justification and legitimacy of 
particular outcome and “surrender our moral judgment” to the superior 
epistemic capacity of democracy (Estlund 2008, 105). 
The example Estlund offers for correctness theory is Rousseau’s 
theory of the general will. Estlund reads Rousseau’s general will as 
providing a procedure-independent criterion for the justification of 
democratic outcomes: “outcomes are legitimate when and because they 
are correct and not for any procedural reason” (Estlund 2008, 103). 
However, such reading simply collapses the distinction between the 
justification and the legitimacy of outcomes, while paying no heed to 
democratic procedure itself. In particular, it obliterates Rousseau’s more 
complex account of the general will, as both procedural and substantive. 
If it is true that democratic decisions ought to be just, according to 
Rousseau, it is also true that they are not legitimate unless they are also 
the product of democratic process. In fact, neither correctly issued 
decisions that fail to respect the substantive criteria of the general will, 
i.e. Rousseau’s famous ‘will of all’ (Rousseau 1763, 230), nor 
substantively correct decisions that fail to pass through people’s “free 
votes” are legitimate (Rousseau 1763, 182). Hence, Rousseau’s account of 
the justification of democracy can be thought of as both intrinsicalist 
and outcome-based, because it requires democratic decisions to be the 
issue of a justified procedure and also as substantively correct, quite 
similarly to Pettit’s (see Peter 2008, 72).   
On the other hand, Estlund’s own epistemic proceduralism takes 
democratic procedures to be justified insofar as they are generally 
acceptable to the qualified and produce ‘better-than-randomly’ justified 
or correct outcomes. If it is true that he does not make reference to the 
epistemic quality of each and every outcome, as Pettit and Rousseau do, 
it is also true that his account is not purely intrinsicalist, for the 
epistemic capacity of democracy to produce better-than-random 
decisions matters to its justification. Thus, Estlund’s account qualifies as 
dualistic, as it justifies democracy because of its intrinsic value, that is its 
qualified acceptability (Estlund 2008, 40-64), and because of its 
instrumental value in achieving on average correct results.  
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To conclude, it seems to me that the distinction proposed in this 
paper is not merely reconstructive, but fulfills a conceptually analytic 
role, as it helps to reformulate the opposition of instrumentalism and 
proceduralism while holding the focus over the justification of 
procedures. To be sure, it does not change the categorization of available 
accounts for the justification of democracy. Still, it offers four 
advantages.  
First, it elucidates the difference, which is sometimes blurred, 
between the justification of particular outcomes and the justification of 
democracy. While the former is necessarily piecemeal if conducted 
irrespective of procedures that issued said outcomes, the latter is 
necessarily holistic, as it applies to the whole decision-making process. 
Moreover, even though instrumentalists still make reference to the 
quality of outcomes, they have to follow a similar scheme as the one of 
intrinsicalist accounts. Both of them take outcomes to be legitimate 
(although they can sometimes be unjustified) in virtue of democratic 
procedures that produce them. Where they differ is over the reasons to 
take these democratic procedures as justified and whether these hold 
contingently or necessarily. 
Second, this paper means to reassess the goal that any justification of 
democratic procedures ought to set up for itself, by making reference to 
some independent, justifying criterion. Following Estlund, it is not 
neutrality over substantive values that qualifies democratic outcomes as 
legitimate. Rather, we ought to abide by these outcomes because there 
are conclusive reasons to take democracy itself as the decision-making 
process that realizes certain important values. The idea is that in case of 
conflict, these are to be preferred, as long as actual democratic 
procedures really realize them. While instrumentalism states that clearly, 
by justifying democracy only indirectly through the results it produces 
on average; intrinsicalism appears to focus only on procedures 
irrespective of the quality of outcomes. However, since democracy is 
intrinsically justified as long as it is necessary for the realization of a 
certain independent value, the possibility that some outcome of actual 
procedures is so contrary to that value to make it illegitimate is always 
open. In this way I read the constraints that are generally put over 
democracy not to undermine itself (e.g. Christiano 2008, Estlund 2008, 
Pettit 2012).  
Third, I think that the distinction between the justification of 
outcomes and the justification of procedures also helps clarifying the 
relationship between legitimacy and justice. While some have taken 
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legitimacy to rely on justice (e.g. Christiano 2008), others have claimed 
that it is independent from justice (e.g. Pettit 2012). If we consider 
outcomes, certainly legitimacy does not hinge on their being right or 
just, as we have seen throughout this article. However, when procedures 
are at hand, justice might be a perfectly sound independent value 
through which to justify democracy. Thus, this analysis shows how 
democratic legitimacy has a complex relation to justice, which does not 
pertain to democratic decisions, but to the reasons that justify the 
democratic process.   
Finally, once we shift the focus from outcomes to procedures, we see 
how Rousseau’s problem of obeying political authority while “remaining 
free as before” has no proper solution (Estlund 2008, 111-112). If 
freedom amounts to a form of self-rule and requires us to do only what 
we see to be justified, the whole idea of political legitimacy seems 
problematic (Wolff 1970). To the extent that legitimacy tells us to do 
things we disagree with because of the way they have been decided, it 
inevitably conflicts with freedom as self-rule or autonomy25. However, to 
the extent that a proper justification, either instrumentalist or 
intrinsicalist, provides us with reasons to prefer the realization of its 
justifying value with respect to some wrongs democracy might produce, 
democratic decisions retain their legitimacy. In the end, it seems, it is up 
to each of us to strike the balance between democracy’s capacity to 
realize a certain value, as political equality or epistemic quality, and its 
failures in such endeavor.  
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